Autocratic Legalism Kim Lane: Scheppele Upd

earned her J.D. and Ph.D. (in anthropology) from the University of Chicago. She taught at the University of Michigan and then at the University of Pennsylvania Law School for a transformative period from 1998 to 2005, where she was the Stephen A. Schiller Professor of Law and a key figure in the interdisciplinary Law & Society movement. During those years, she wrote foundational work on constitutional identity, emergency powers, and Central European transitions—work that directly foreshadowed autocratic legalism.

While she moved to Princeton’s Department of Sociology in 2005 (with affiliations to the Woodrow Wilson School and the Program in Law and Public Policy), her voice remains prominent in Penn circles. She has been a frequent speaker at the at Penn, and many of her key post-2010 articles were developed during sabbaticals and workshops in Philadelphia. The association is so strong that even the University of Chicago Law Review symposium on autocratic legalism included UPenn scholars as commentators, reinforcing the mental link. autocratic legalism kim lane scheppele upd

Thus, searching “autocratic legalism UPenn” will pull up not only Scheppele’s work but also related scholarship by Penn’s own David C. Williams, Eric Feldman, and the late Howard Lesnick—all of whom debated and extended her framework. The keyword “upd” is almost certainly a search engine fragment from “upenn dot edu” or a misspelling of “UPenn.” No theory goes unchallenged. Critics of autocratic legalism raise three objections. earned her J

First, Some scholars argue that Scheppele’s framework risks labeling any aggressive, partisan use of legal power as “autocratic.” If a democratic majority packs a court (as FDR threatened), is that autocratic legalism? Scheppele answers with a distinction of entrenchment versus policy . FDR wanted to change policy; Orbán wanted to change the ability of future majorities to ever change policy again . The latter is autocratic legalism; the former is constitutional hardball within a still-competitive system. She taught at the University of Michigan and

Third, If autocratic legalism operates through legal forms, what legal remedy exists? Scheppele is sober. She has argued that international bodies like the EU cannot simply “enforce” democracy because the infringements are written into domestic constitutions. Instead, she advocates for what she calls militant democracy 2.0 —not banning parties, but requiring supermajorities for constitutional changes, protecting judicial independence with international treaty locks, and creating “right to democracy” actions before the European Court of Human Rights. Whether these cures can work against a determined government with control of parliament and the press remains, she admits, an open question. Part VI: Why Autocratic Legalism Matters Now As of the mid-2020s, autocratic legalism is no longer a niche concept. It has appeared in amicus briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court, in European Parliament resolutions, and in the strategic litigation of civil society groups from Warsaw to Brasília (where Jair Bolsonaro’s administration showed clear autocratic legalist patterns). Scheppele’s framework has been cited in testimony on Hungary before the U.S. Helsinki Commission and in the European Commission’s rule-of-law reports.

Second, Critics from the Global South note that many post-colonial nations have always used legal forms to maintain oligarchic control—South Africa under apartheid, for example. Is autocratic legalism new, or simply a rebranding of “managed democracy”? Scheppele concedes the point in recent work, acknowledging that the Hungarian model borrows from earlier “electoral authoritarian” regimes in Russia and Singapore. However, she insists the term retains analytic value because it captures the performative hypocrisy of claiming liberal legality while destroying it—a hypocrisy that previous authoritarian legal forms did not bother to maintain.